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Charmaine G. Ramos

**The Philippines' Social Policy
Response to Covid-19:
Troubles with Targeted
Social Assistance**



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THE PHILIPPINES' SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSE TO COVID-19: TROUBLES WITH TARGETED SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

Charmaine G. Ramos *

ABSTRACT

This report analyzes the Philippines' ambitious response to the economic risks and dislocation wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic during the first wave of the pandemic in 2020: a set of targeted income support measures that intended to cover unprecedented shares of the population. It contextualizes the assessment of the social assistance measures in terms of the reforms in the over-all social protection system in the last decade, which strengthened the foothold of targeting as a modality of social provisioning. The delays, patchiness and segmentation of social assistance reveal how these reforms have evidently not enabled the country to build up the institutional infrastructure to respond in a speedy and effective manner to a crisis of the scale that the pandemic poses and doing so bring into sharp focus both the dangers and the limits of reforms that strongly orient social protection systems to poverty reduction rather than universal rights and entitlements to protection.

INTRODUCTION

The Philippines is currently in the throes of a second and more severe wave of the Covid-19 pandemic and struggling with overcoming, through social policy responses, the economic and social dislocations wrought by this ongoing crisis. Evocative of the growing frustration in the government's responses to ostensibly ease the associated hardships felt by large swathes of the population, communities across the country began setting up independent pantries in April 2021 – foodbanks that invited people to “give according to their ability and take according to their need”. At the time of writing this report, as many as 350 such community pantries have been established throughout the country (Valenzuela 2021). An assessment of income support measures enacted during the first wave of the pandemic in 2020 provides a good optic for understanding the roots and causes of the dissatisfaction with the government's social policy responses.

This report undertakes the task of examining social assistance schemes collectively referred to as the Emergency Subsidy Program (ESP), which was rolled out soon after the first lockdown was enforced in March 2020. The ESP, which is constituted by several targeted one-off cash transfer programs, was ambitious in aiming to reach as much as 83 percent of the total population of households. It was described by the Department of Finance (2020) as the “largest social protection program in Philippine history”. The significance of the ESP is also corroborated by Gentilini et al. (2020:6), who report that the Philippines is seventh in the top ten countries in the world with highest coverage rates (as a percentage of the population) of Covid-19 related cash transfers.

The roll-out of income support measures on such an ambitious scale during the pandemic proffers a unique lens to assess the dexterity and adequacy of the Philippines' existing social protection system. This is a system that has undergone important reforms from the mid-2000s, which centered around giving increasing prominence to poverty targeting as an organizing principle in the provisioning of social protection. As will be shown in this

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Acknowledgements: This report draws on the ongoing research work on social protection responses to the Covid-19 pandemic currently being undertaken by the author with Emma Dadap-Cantal and Andrew Fischer under the auspices of the ERC-funded 'Political Economy of Externally Financed Social Protection' project (AIDSOCPRO) at the International Institute of Social Studies.

report, the problems in the implementation of the ESP put into question the crisis responsiveness of an intrinsically segregated system that in recent years has been increasingly oriented toward poverty reduction and targeting.

In a nutshell, implementation of the ESP was patchy, delayed and best described as two-tiered. The segmentation of the response, whereby some sections of the population received aid faster than others, has fostered social tensions. These instantiate how the system is not geared for the purposes of functioning as an effective and agile system of protection during a time of crisis.

The first section provides an overview of the social protection system, including how poverty-targeted modalities of provisioning have taken a foothold in a middle-income developing country like the Philippines. Following the explanation of this broader policy context, the second section discusses the more immediate context in which ESP was implemented – including the situation in regard to the Covid-19 pandemic during the first wave – as well as details of the specific income support measures constituting the ESP. The third section discusses the patchy, delayed, and segmented implementation of the ESP, and explains how this illustrates the dangers of having built up a social protection system that is orientated towards poverty targeting and reduction.

— SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLICY CONTEXT

The Philippines is a middle-income developing country, which after being described as the basket case of Asia in the 1980s, has seen a period of steady if modest growth from the 1990s onwards. In particular, based on data from the WB (2021), average annual growth declined from 6 percent in the 1970s to 2 percent in the 1980s, but since then has been increasing from 3 percent in the 1990s, 5 percent in the 2000s, and 6 percent in the 2010s. Since the 2010s, the country has also been seeing increased public spending in the social sector – with expenditures in the sector overtaking those in economic services, interest payments, general public services, and defense (Ramos, 2020: 496-497).

Despite the relative improvements in economic growth and the prioritization of the social sector in recent years, the country's performance in terms of dealing with poverty and inequality has not been as stellar – particularly in comparison to its neighboring countries in the Southeast Asian region (Ramos, 2021: 4). Data from the WB (2019a) covering 1981–2017 show that in contrast to Malaysia and Thailand, which had virtually eradicated absolute poverty by the mid-1990s, the Philippines has the highest poverty headcount ratio as of 2015. Moreover, Indonesia and Thailand have been better than the Philippines in seeing declines in levels of income inequality, particularly from 2000 onwards (World Bank, 2019b).

The ESP is thus being implemented in a developing country where economic and social policy expansion have been largely unaccompanied by redistributive advances such as those that could be seen in its neighboring countries in the Southeast Asian region. Moreover, it is being implemented in the context of a highly segmented social protection system, which is constituted by a contributory social security system mostly covering formal sector employees, and a non-contributory social assistance system, which in turn is anchored on a poverty-targeted conditional cash transfers program. The WB (2016) estimates that only 38 percent of wage and salaried workers, who constitute about 55 percent of total employment, contribute to either the Social Security System (for private sector workers) or the Government Service Insurance System (for public sector workers); and that as many as 75 percent of Filipino workers are informally employed (WB, 2016: 3). Meanwhile, the conditional transfers program, the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (tr. Bridging Program for the Filipino Family), hereinafter *Pantawid*, covers about four million out of the total 24 million households. Together, these figures hint at the limits of the reach of the contributory and non-contributory social protection system.

This segmented system evolved on the back of social policy expansion characterized by the strengthening hold of poverty-targeted, as opposed to universal modalities of social provisioning. As argued in Ramos (2020), social policy expansion in the Philippines has been characterized by the pursuit of 'narrow universalism', focused on first expanding access to social protection schemes like conditional cash transfers, national health insurance, or social pensions to the poor deemed worthy of protection, without necessarily establishing a unified and integrated over-all system for all. This could be traced back to the adoption from the mid-2000s of a set of policies that has framed the meaning and functions ascribed to social protection in line with a pronounced ideational turn in development discourse. This turn relates to the ascendance of the idea of pursuing 'poverty reduction' as the primary developmental goal, and the use of social protection towards this end. Here, 'the poor' are treated as a 'residual category' requiring targeted and distinct policies. It is an approach that pins the well-being of a majority

of the population on poverty-reduction initiatives rather than on broader processes of structural transformation. Moreover, targeted modalities of social service provisioning are promoted as the ideal cost-effective means of reducing poverty, ostensibly directing public resources to the more ‘deserving poor’ in the Global South. The shift in development thinking that these propositions embody has been criticized as promoting an ahistorical view of development, a palliative solution to poverty, and a policy approach that fails both to address the structural roots of penury and to realize the transformative functions of social protection (for example, see Mkandawire 2009 and Devereux et al. 2009). But beyond these criticisms, this report shows that the experience of the Philippines in rolling out social assistance during the pandemic reveals that the influence of this ideational turn on the evolution of the country’s social protection system has been evidently detrimental to the ability of this system to effectively and dexterously provision protection during a crisis.

The entrenchment of poverty-targeted modalities of social protection provisioning in the Philippines was kicked off by the adoption in 2007 of the Social Protection Policy Framework.¹ In line with the above-described ideational turn, the framework defines social protection as referring to government programs that reduce poverty and vulnerability to risk and promote the rights of the marginalized to livelihood and employment, and against sudden loss of income. The way the definition was operationalized in the subsequent years – for example, through the National Social Protection Strategy and Social Protection Operational Framework,² which were adopted in 2009 and 2011 respectively – exhibits a watering down of aspects of the conceptualization of social protection that relate to universal rights and entitlements. Instantiating this point are three policy developments that could be traced to the adoption of the said policy, strategy, and operational frameworks.

First, the instrumental role of social protection in the mitigation of short-term income and consumption collapses and in poverty reduction is emphasized. In line with the latter, a policy decision was made to make social protection an integrated part of the nation’s overall poverty-reduction strategy (WB 2018: 19-20). Consequently, the *Pantawid*, which was first launched in 2007 as a temporary, small-scale poverty alleviation initiative targeting just 6000 households, became the government’s centerpiece social assistance and poverty-alleviation program. By 2019, a law had been enacted that made it a permanent government program.³

Second, the establishment of a unified national targeting mechanism became a key component of the national social protection strategy, signaling the widening scope of targeting in the broader system. With strong donor support⁴ the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction or *Listahanan*, a portmanteau combining the Filipino words for list (*lista*) and home (*tahanan*), was consequently set up in 2010. The *Listahanan* is a social registry that classifies the poverty status of households in all rural and selected poor urban areas based on proxy means testing. As of 2020, five government bodies were using the registry to identify social assistance beneficiaries for major programs, including: national health insurance (PhilHealth); cash transfers to alleviate the effects of tax reforms; financial assistance for tertiary education; milk supplementation to address child malnutrition; and rice subsidies. Worryingly, the *Listahanan* drawn up in 2009 had been the basis of choosing *Pantawid* beneficiaries until at least 2018. The government – for administrative and political reasons – has been unable to update this registry in a timely fashion. This implies that between 2009 to 2018, *Pantawid* had been targeting beneficiaries based on an increasingly obsolete registry (Dadap-Cantal et al. 2021).

Third, addressing fragmentation or fostering convergence – cast in terms of rationalizing the administration of multiple, uncoordinated social protection programs – became a central pre-occupation of reform. Fragmentation has been largely cast as an administrative problem remedied through organizational reform and – in line with the second point above – the use of the *Listahanan* across government programs. Poverty targeting, by rationalizing the choice of recipients deemed worthy of public assistance, was used as an instrument for promoting convergence. As noted by Dadap-Cantal et al. (2021), these views stand in sharp contrast to those of critical social policy scholars (see for example, Fischer 2010, 2020; Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea 2016; Lavinias, 2013; Mkandawire 2015; UNRISD 2010), who conceive of fragmentation as being about segmentation of access to social services across social groups and classes, which in turn can in fact be exacerbated by targeting;

1 NEDA SDC Resolution No 1, Series of 2007.

2 NEDA SDC Resolution No 2, Series of 2009; NEDA SDC Resolution No 3, Series of 2012.

3 Republic Act 11310, *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program – Bridging Programme for the Filipino Family* – also known as the 4Ps Act, signed into law in April 2019.

4 For a discussion of the extent and nature of the support of international organizations like the WB and ADB, see Dadap-Cantal et al. (2021).

and who conceive of convergence as relating to the greater integration of social assistance with social security systems (Dadap-Cantal et al. 2021:6).

The dynamics of social protection provisioning during the pandemic need to be understood with reference to the above-summarized policy developments, in as far as they have been structuring the institutional modalities and capacities for social provisioning. Doing this also allows for the interrogation of the broader turn that the policy developments embody, especially given the support in ideational and pecuniary terms that the international donors and organizations have been giving to the same. For example, according to the WB (2019c), USD 505 million was made available by the Bank to the Philippines to finance the Social Welfare and Development Reform Project I from 2009 to 2015, under whose auspices social policy developments described in this section happened. An additional USD 450 million was made available for the second phase of the project (2016–19), to which a further USD 300 million was added to extend support through to 2021. The policy developments supported by these loans have also been lauded in reports and assessments associated with the Bank. For example, in its latest review of the Philippines' social protection system, the WB (2018) celebrates the ostensible poverty-alleviating impact of targeted social assistance programs, even as it flags the continuing problems with coherence and fragmentation of social protection programs across the sub-sectors of social insurance, social assistance, and labor market regulations. It even describes the system as having a high level of institutional development and the flexibility to respond to emergencies, shocks, or crises (WB 2018:5-6). The rest of the report presents evidence that puts this positive assessment into question.

THE PHILIPPINES' SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSE: THE CASE OF INCOME SUPPORT

Despite implementing a lockdown that has been touted as one of the longest and strictest in the world, the Philippines is one of the countries that has been worst hit by the Covid-19 pandemic in the Southeast Asian region,⁵ in terms of infections and deaths – whether measured in number of cumulative cases or cases per million. The Philippines' Department of Health (DOH) reported the first case of Covid-19 infection in the country on 30 January 2020 and confirmed the first case of local transmission on 7 March (WHO, 2020b). Based on the government's official data, weekly cases in 2020 peaked in the week beginning 7 August, when 25,503 infections were reported. However, weekly cases of infection had been declining since, standing at 13,881 cases per week as of 7 October 2020 (DOH 2020), before the second wave. Based on data from the WHO (2020a) as of 24 October,⁶ a little over seven months after the first recorded case of local transmission, the Philippines has had 365,799 confirmed cases of infection and 6,915 deaths. These figures were not the worst in the world but were some of the worst in Southeast Asia. In particular, the figure for cumulative cases of infection was, as of November 2020, the second highest in the region, and 20th in the world; that for deaths was second highest in the region and 22nd in the world. Meanwhile, as of the same date, the Philippines had 3,338 infection cases per million population, a figure that was the second highest in the region and equivalent to 62 percent of the global average of 5,356. It reported 63 deaths per million – the highest in the region and equivalent to 43 percent of the global average of 146. These comparisons must of course be appreciated with caution, given the differences in levels of testing across the world. For example, as of October 2020, while Singapore had an estimated 596 tests per thousand population, the Philippines only had 39 tests per confirmed case (Hasell et al. 2020). This gives a hint of the extent to which the figures for infections and deaths in the Philippines may be an underestimation of true values.

To mitigate the spread of infections, the Philippine government imposed a lockdown about a week after the first confirmed case of local transmission. Called 'community quarantine', the lockdown was first imposed in the capital city of Manila in 15 March. Soon after, community quarantine covered an increasing number of regions in the country, on which varying levels of restrictions were imposed depending on the number of confirmed cases of infection in a given region. Community quarantine restrictions are still ongoing – even as they have been pared

5 Includes: Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Brunei, Timor-Leste and the Philippines.

6 All quantitative data cited in this paragraph is from WHO (2020a) except the data on testing rates and weekly cases of infection.

down in most regions – with the government recently announcing the extension of lockdown conditions up to 31 October 2020 in key urban centers.

As in the rest of the world, the pandemic and consequent lockdown imposed severe social and economic costs on large swathes of the population – perhaps worst on the poorest of the poor, but not just limited to them. In a rapid assessment exercise conducted in May 2020 by the non-government organization World Vision, 92 percent of their surveyed households⁷ reported a loss or disruption of livelihoods as a direct result of the pandemic; 71 percent, a loss of jobs or a salary reduction; and 68 percent, an inability to fully finance food expenses (World Vision, 2020). Economists from a government think tank estimate that in the best-case scenario of household incomes contracting by just five percent, as many as 2.6 million more households would be pushed below the official poverty line than would have been without the pandemic (Albert et al., 2020:29).

As shown in Appendix 2, the national government deployed a range of social policy responses to the pandemic soon after the onset of the outbreak, including: social assistance schemes involving income support schemes and relief distribution; labor market regulations – including additional allowances and insurance for frontline health sector workers; healthcare subsidization to cover for Covid-19-related medical costs; and adjustments in education provisioning – in particular to facilitate remote learning. By September 2020, the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte had signed into law two omnibus acts that legally enabled the implementation of these responses.⁸ The first of the two – RA 11469 (Bayanihan⁹ to Heal Act, hereinafter Bayanihan Act) – was enacted in March 2020, about a week after the announcement of the lockdown; the second – RA 11494 (Bayanihan to Recover Act, hereinafter Bayanihan 2 Act), in September 2020. The Bayanihan Act primarily provided the legal basis for social protection measures. It enabled the implementation of a range of income support schemes and directs the national health insurance system¹⁰ to cover the medical costs incurred by individuals for Covid-19 treatment. Meanwhile, while the Bayanihan 2 Act similarly also enabled social protection schemes, it more pronouncedly outlined stimulus measures to instigate economic recovery.

Table 1. Target beneficiaries of Social Amelioration Programs as of May 2020

Program	Target beneficiaries	Number of target beneficiaries
DWSD Emergency Subsidy Program (DSWD-ESP)	Poor, low-income and vulnerable families	17.9 million families
DOLE COVID-19 Adjustment Measures Program (DOLE-CAMP)	Formal sector employees	657,201 individuals
DOLE Financial Assistance for Displaced Land-based and Sea-based Filipino Workers (DOLE-AKAP)	Overseas Filipino Workers	250,000 individuals
DOLE Emergency Employment for Disadvantaged and Displaced Workers (DOLE-TUPAD)	Formal and informal sector employees	337,198 individuals
DA Financial Subsidy to Rice Farmers (DA-FRSF)	Smallholder rice farmers	591,246 individuals

Source: Office of the President (OP) (2020b, pp. 2–4)

The ESP forms the umbrella under which income support measures were enabled by the Bayanihan Act. It is made up of several Social Amelioration Programs (SAPs), shown in Table 1 and which are administered by various agencies of the executive branch of government. The SAPs are constituted by cash-based social assis-

7 The rapid assessment, based on a methodology involving key informant interviews and a household survey, was conducted from May to June 2020, covering 985 respondents from 42 municipalities and six cities in 20 provinces in the Philippines.

8 Aside from initiatives by the central government enabled by legislation presented in Appendix 2, some local government units and executive agencies/departments implemented their own social policy responses – topping up assistance provided under the auspices of legislation-enabled schemes.

9 A Filipino word meaning ‘cooperative endeavor’.

10 About a year before the Covid-19 pandemic-wrought crisis, the Universal Health Care Act was signed into law in the Philippines, which automatically enrolls all Filipino citizens in the National Health Insurance.

tance measures with mutually exclusive target beneficiaries¹¹ that include: poor, low-income and/or vulnerable households; public utility vehicle drivers and operators; displaced formal sector and overseas Filipino workers; and smallholder rice farmers.¹² Assuming that – as intended – beneficiaries of each of the SAPs constitute mutually exclusive households, the targeted coverage of the ESP could reach a total of about 20 of the 24 million or about 83 percent of the total households in the Philippines. Given these levels of targeted coverage, the ESP is indeed historic in its attempt to provide protective coverage for segments of the population mostly unreached by the existing system of social protection, which as noted in the first section, is concentrated on workers in the formal sector via the social security system, and poor families reached through the conditional cash transfers program.

The largest of the SAPs in terms of coverage is the program administered by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). It sought to provide cash transfers of between PHP 5,000 and 8,000¹³ per month per household (depending on the minimum wage in the region of residence of a given household) for two months¹⁴ to 17.9 million households in the Philippines. These transfers are equivalent to about 47 to 75 percent of the 2018 monthly poverty income threshold; and 67 to 106 percent of the 2018 monthly subsistence income threshold. The program's target beneficiaries include: 4.4 million family beneficiaries¹⁵ of the *Pantawid* and poor and near-poor households, which were to be identified by local government officials on the basis of having household members who were: (a) employed in the informal sector or transport sector, or (b) otherwise deemed "vulnerable" (for example, indigent indigenous peoples, homeless individuals, pregnant or lactating women, overseas Filipino workers in distress, or persons with disabilities). Meanwhile, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was at the helm of various SAPs for displaced formal and informal sector workers, and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) whose employment has been affected by the pandemic. These include a one-time cash transfer in the amount of PHP 5,000¹⁶ for formal sector workers employed in enterprises affected by the pandemic; and a one-time cash transfer of PHP 10,000¹⁷ for affected OFWs. Meanwhile, displaced workers (including those from the informal sector) who did not receive grants through any of the aforementioned cash transfer programs were eligible to take part in a temporary employment program administered by the DOLE. Under this scheme, they were due to receive wages equivalent to the prevailing minimum wage in exchange for four hours work a day, for a maximum of ten days. Finally, the Department of Agriculture led in the administration of a program of one-time cash transfers, to the amount of PHP 5,000¹⁸ for rice farmers with farm sizes of one hectare or below.

— Tensions and Consequences

Based on the weekly reports¹⁹ of the Office of the President to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee from May to October 2020, there were severe delays in the implementation of the ESP. The cash transfers were supposed to provide income support in April and May, which at the time of signing the Act was the projected duration of the lockdown. But of the SAPs, only the schemes of the DOLE for formal and informal sector workers were fully implemented within the two-month time frame. Based on the President's Report on 1 June, the DOLE had distributed the intended cash transfers to about 1 million targeted formal and informal sector worker beneficiar-

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- 11 The receipt of cash transfers under one of these programs renders the beneficiary ineligible for any other social amelioration program under the ESP.
 - 12 Aside from the SAPs, the Philippine government also embarked upon a wage subsidy program for formal sector employees of small businesses whose operations were negatively affected by the pandemic. Administered by the Social Security System, the program provided cash transfers to a targeted 3.4 million individuals and of the same amount and frequency as the SAP administered by the DSWD.
 - 13 About EUR 85 to 137, as of 19 May 2021.
 - 14 The months of April and May, which covered the expected duration of the lockdown when the Bayanihan Act was first signed into law.
 - 15 For two months, *Pantawid* families were to receive a cash transfer that tops up what they usually receive as a conditional cash grant up to the amount mandated under the ESP.
 - 16 About EUR 85, as of 19 May 2021.
 - 17 About EUR 171, as of 19 May 2021.
 - 18 About EUR 85, as of 19 May 2021.
 - 19 The Bayanihan Act mandates that a weekly report on the implementation of the Act be submitted by the Office of the President to this committee.

ies (OP 2020b:2). Meanwhile, there were evident delays in the rest of the SAPs. The DA reported that only 70 percent of intended beneficiaries for the program covering smallholder rice farmers had received the intended transfers as of 9 June (OP 2020a:15). The DOLE also reported delays in the distribution of transfers to OFWs; and as of the President's Report on 15 June, only PHP 1.57 billion of the PHP 2.5 billion budget allotment for the program had been utilized (OP 2020a:2).

The DSWD-administered part of the ESP, which as explained above is the most significant of all, suffered a similar if not a worse fate. For instance, the first of two intended tranches of the cash transfers had not been fully disbursed in October 2020, seven months after the passage of the Bayanihan Act. DSWD (2020) reports as of 30 October 2020 that 17.6 million of the 17.9 million target households have received the first tranche (DSWD 2020). Worse, as noted by Dadap-Cantal et al. (2020:2), the program was not just delayed, but even retrenched midstream its implementation. The government decided that the second tranche, which it only began distributing on 11 June, would be distributed to about 14 million families living in communities where lockdown conditions had not been eased and to those who were eligible but did not make it to the list of beneficiaries approved by the DSWD.²⁰

The delays in the delivery of what are essentially targeted transfers exhibit the inadequacy of a social protection system whose central function has increasingly been orientated towards poverty reduction. The supreme irony is that despite more than a decade and the extent of resources spent in shoring up capacities for targeting, it remained incapable of undertaking this very function in a speedy manner during the pandemic.

Aside from the logistical difficulties posed by the pandemic,²¹ the problems with identifying ESP beneficiaries were an important reason for the delay in the distribution of DSWD-administered cash transfers. The *Listahanan* was ultimately not up to the task of targeting those who needed assistance during the pandemic and was used only as basis to estimate the numbers of beneficiaries within localities, and to draw up the list of *Pantawid* beneficiaries, who in turn constituted merely 25 percent of the targeted recipients. The targeting of the majority of the social assistance beneficiaries was left to the DSWD and local government units (LGUs). The process of beneficiary identification²² entailed LGUs producing a list of target cash transfer recipients, based on forms – the Social Amelioration Cards (SACs) – that they distributed to non-*Pantawid* families in order to obtain household profiles. The consolidated list of beneficiaries drawn up by LGUs based on these forms were then validated by DSWD field officers, who checked to make sure that *Pantawid* families were not on the LGU list, to avoid the duplication of benefits.

Based on the President's Report to Congress in October 2020, there were two tension points in this collaborative process of beneficiary identification, which caused further delays in the distribution of the cash transfers (OP 2020c:2). First, there were tensions in the setting of the upper limit on the number of beneficiaries per LGU jurisdiction, which is determined by the DSWD based on the *Listahanan*, with LGUs often arguing for more beneficiaries than those allocated to them. Second, there were also issues in the determination of sectors deemed vulnerable – with LGUs lobbying for the expansion of said sectors and even refusing to help the DSWD in the implementation of the program on this basis. Further evidence for these tensions is also found in newspaper accounts reporting local government officials complaining that the number of beneficiaries (the “indicative number”) set by the DSWD for their respective cities or municipalities was much lower than their actual count of families who needed assistance in this time of crisis (CNN, 2020; Rey, 2020). The stance of LGUs pertaining to expanding the list is understandable, given that DSWD reports that both LGU and DSWD personnel have received threats from constituents and cites this as another major reason for program delays.

These tensions give a flavor of the overarching technical costs and political problems associated with targeted social protection, particularly in the context of crisis. The celebrated *Listahanan* has not proven to be a functional and deployable national targeting system in this context after all. Instead, targeting became a politicized process of beneficiary identification, whereby local government officials played a key discretionary role in drawing up

20 As noted by Dadap-Cantal et al. (2020:2), it is not clear why there have been ‘left out’ families.

21 In the President's Report on the Bayanihan Act on 22 June, the DSWD indicated that the exposure of DSWD and local government personnel to Covid-19-infected individuals and their subsequent quarantining, and the postponement of pay-outs due to increasing numbers of infected individuals in a given community were among the major reasons for delays in the distribution of the first tranche in April (OP 2020c:2).

22 The process is spelled out in DSWD (2020), an administrative memo for the purposes of coordinating the implementation of the SAPs by various executive branch departments of the government.

beneficiary lists. By the government's own accounts, as of May 2020, 408 individuals had filed complaints on alleged anomalies in the distribution of assistance under SAPs. Out of these, 83 officials and individuals have been charged criminally, while the rest were under investigation (OP 2020a:3).

The delays also put into question the strategy of going about 'convergence' by increasing the scope of poverty targeting, rather than building a universal and integrated social security system. The resultant infrastructure from years of reforms has evidently not been robust enough to provision the near-universal levels of social protection that are required during the pandemic.

Instead of providing the building blocks for the universalization of social protection, the strategy has only led to further segmentation of the system, as exhibited by the 'two-tiered' response to the crisis. When the WB and Australia Aid conducted a survey of low-income households in April 2020 to ascertain the welfare impact of the pandemic and the effectiveness of social protection schemes in place, they found that there was a significant difference in the pace of cash transfers distribution between *Pantawid* and non-*Pantawid* households. They found that almost all *Pantawid* households had received the first tranche of transfers by April, in contrast to less than 20 percent of non-*Pantawid* households. Aside from having earlier drawn up a list of *Pantawid* beneficiaries through *Listahanan*, the transfers could be made to them readily through the existing system of digital transfers under *Pantawid*. They also found that given the relatively more timely provisioning of social protection to *Pantawid* households, they were also significantly less likely to report suffering from food security compared to non-*Pantawid* households (Cho et al. 2021:10). As documented by Dadap-Cantal et al. (2020), the differences in the speed of assistance across segments of the population has fostered social hostilities. It has given rise to the perception that *Pantawid* families are prioritized for social assistance, in the sense that they are automatically eligible for the program. This in turn has drawn public attention to the poorer recipients of social assistance – with a noticeable proliferation of anti-poor sentiments in the media after the distribution of the first tranche.²³

The administrative and political bottlenecks showcased in this section in regard to the distribution of cash transfers exhibit some of the problems of targeted social protection in two senses. First, the problems in distributing the targeted cash transfers, after more than a decade of reforms that ostensibly shored up the capacity for targeted social protection, puts into question the effectiveness of such reforms in building up the flexibility and adaptability of the over-all system to periods of extreme crisis. Second, they also highlight the complexity and costs – and ultimate ineffectiveness – of rolling out targeted modes of social protection in a context where the need for assistance is at near universal levels.

CONCLUSION

This report analyzed the Philippines' ambitious response to the economic risks and dislocation wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic during the first wave of the pandemic in 2020: a set of targeted income support measures that intended to cover unprecedented shares of the population. It contextualized the assessment of these social assistance measures in terms of the reforms in the over-all social protection system in the last decade, which have strengthened the foothold of targeting as a modality of social provisioning. The delays in the delivery and segmentation of social assistance reveal how these reforms have not enabled the country to build up the institutional infrastructure to respond in a speedy and effective manner to a crisis of the scale that the pandemic poses, and doing so bring into sharp focus both the dangers and the limits of reforms that strongly orient social protection systems to poverty reduction rather than universal rights and entitlements to protection.

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**APPENDIX 1: SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 BY POLICY AREA
(THE PHILIPPINES, JANUARY–SEPTEMBER 2020)**

	Policy Area	Pensions	Healthcare	Long-term care and disability	Labor market	Education
(1)	Have there been any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(2)	If (1) yes, have any of these reforms been explicit responses to the Covid-19 pandemic?	N/A	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes
(3)	If (2) yes, has there been significant regional variation in the implementation of these reforms?	N/A	No	N/A	No	No
(4)	Have subnational governments enacted any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	N/A	Don't know	N/A	Don't know	Don't know
	Policy Area	Family benefits	Housing	Social assistance	Other*	
(1)	Have there been any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	
(2)	If (1) yes, have any of these reforms been explicit responses to the Covid-19 pandemic?	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	
(3)	If (2) yes, has there been significant regional variation in the implementation of these reforms?	N/A	No	Yes	No	
(4)	Have subnational governments enacted any significant legislative reforms in the indicated policy area during the indicated time period?	N/A	Don't know	Don't know	Don't know	

* Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social protection, e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection.

APPENDIX 2: SOCIAL POLICY LEGISLATION IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 (THE PHILIPPINES, JANUARY–SEPTEMBER 2020)

Note: This appendix covers all major national social policy legislation in response to Covid-19 published between 1 January 2020 and 30 September 2020.

Law 1		
(1)	Number of law	RA 11469
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Bayanihan to Heal as One Act
(3)	Name of law (English)	Bayanihan to Heal as One Act
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	23 March 2020
(5)	Date of law's enactment	24 March 2020
(6)	Date of law's publication	25 March 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Yes
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	Not Applicable
(10)	Note on (7)-(9) (max. 300 words)	Law passed by the Philippine government declaring a state of national emergency as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and granting the president additional powers. These powers include the enactment of Social Amelioration Programs (SAPs) for vulnerable sectors, and the power to realign the national budget for the purpose of financing these programs.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	Yes
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	5
Law 1: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Social assistance
(14)	Brief description of reform component	Provision of one-off transfers in cash and in kind to low-income family households working in the informal economy, and other segments of the population deemed vulnerable (e.g. households with displaced formal and informal sector workers, smallholder agricultural producers, overseas workers, indigent indigenous peoples, homeless individuals, pregnant or lactating women, persons with disabilities).
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Expansion
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Two months
(18)	Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	Law enables the implementation of a number of targeted income support schemes, whose beneficiaries are mutually exclusive, and identified on the basis of income or attributes of vulnerability specified in (14) above. The most significant of the schemes, in terms of coverage, is the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)-administered Emergency Subsidy Program (ESP), which provides cash transfers to 18 out of 24 million households nationwide, including sections of the population not covered by the existing Conditional Cash Transfer program, which covers about 4.4 million households. Aside from the ESP, the law also authorizes the realignment of the national budget to finance and prioritize new and/or existing social assistance programs of the government, including (but not limited to) programs of the: 1) DSWD providing financial assistance to 'individuals in crisis' for the purposes of urgent medical [to be continued]

Law 1: Component 1		
(18)	[Continued] Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	and burial needs; supplemental feeding; relief distribution, and livelihood assistance; (2) DA providing one-off cash grants to smallholding rice farmers; and (3) DOLE providing: one-off cash assistance to overseas Filipino workers left jobless or stranded due to the pandemic; temporary public works employment program for displaced informal sector workers; one-off cash assistance to displaced formal sector workers.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Expansion
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Two months
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	The benefits from ESP amount to a maximum cash transfer of PHP 5,000 to PHP 8,000 per household for two months (April – May 2020) – depending on the minimum wage in the region of residence of a given household. This is an expansion of benefits for beneficiaries of the existing conditional cash transfers program, who usually receive an average of PHP 2,150 per month. This is topped up by the ESP program up to the maximum cash transfer relevant to a given household.
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	PHP 112.47 billion
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Click to enter your text.
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	The breakdown of the estimated cost, by recipient government agency, is as follows (for the specific social assistance program covered by the agencies, please refer to item (18) above: (a) DSWD – PHP 101.42 billion; (b) DA – PHP 3 billion; (c) DOLE – PHP 8.05 billion. The source of information is the Office of the President's 10th report to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Implementation of RA 11469 (1 June 2020).
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	to a large degree
Law 1: Component 2		
(13)	Policy Area	Labor market
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	The law has provisions granting additional benefits to public and private health workers, authorizing the temporary hiring of additional human resources for the health sector, authorizing alternative working arrangements in the public and private sectors.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	None
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Expansion
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	The additional benefits granted to public health workers include: (a) Covid-19 Special Risk Allowance (SRA); (b) coverage of all medical expenses incurred as a result of exposure to Covid-19; (c) compensation to the amount of PHP 100,000 for those contracting a severe Covid-19 infection; (d) compensation of PHP 1 million, in case of death due to working during the pandemic. Private health workers are granted all these benefits except the Covid-19 SRA.

Law 1: Component 2		
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(26)	Note on (23)-(25) (max. 200 words)	See (22) for details of the new benefits
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Don't Know
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	There is no published estimated total cost of the labor market regulations described in (14) above. In the 13 th Report of the President to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Implementation of RA 11469 (22 June 2020), PHP 246.69 billion has been distributed to public health workers.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	to a large degree

Law 1: Component 3		
(13)	Policy Area	Healthcare
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	The law provides that the cost of treatment for all Covid-19 patients shall be covered by the National Health Insurance Program of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth).
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	None
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Expansion
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	The coverage is determined by PhilHealth, based on severity of the case and a pre-determined case rate ranging from PHP 43,997 to PHP 786,384.
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Don't Know
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Don't Know
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	None
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 1: Component 4		
(13)	Policy Area	Housing
(14)	Brief description of reform component	The law provides for a 30-day grace period on residential rents in areas at the highest level of 'community quarantine', without penalties and other charges
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Not applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	None
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	None
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Don't Know
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	None
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 1: Component 5		
(13)	Policy Area	Other (Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social protection (e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection))
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	The law provides for grace periods in the payment of bank loans and payments to the social security system, as well as for the filing and payment of taxes.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17)	Not applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Don't Know
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608

Law 1: Component 5		
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31)	None
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 2		
(1)	Number of law	RA 11480
(2)	Name of law (original language)	An Act amending Section 3 of Republic Act no. 7797, otherwise known as "an Act to lengthen the school calendar from two hundred (200) days to not more than two hundred twenty (220) class days"
(3)	Name of law (English)	An Act amending Section 3 of Republic Act no. 7797, otherwise known as "an Act to lengthen the school calendar from two hundred (200) days to not more than two hundred twenty (220) class days"
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	26 May 2020
(5)	Date of law's enactment	17 July 2020
(6)	Date of law's publication	20 July 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	No
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Don't know
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	Not Applicable
(10)	Note on (7)-(9) (max. 300 words)	This law was passed by the Senate on 1 June 2020; and adopted by the HOR on 4 June 2020. The reform authorized by this law is likely a response to the state of emergency declared by the president due to the Covid-19 pandemic, though this is not explicitly specified in bill.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	No
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	1

Law 2: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	The law authorizes the amendment of the start date of the school year set at the first Monday of June in the event of the declaration of a state of emergency or calamity.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	None
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21) (max. 200 words)	None
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable

Law 2: Component 1		
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Don't know
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Don't know
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31) (max. 200 words)	None
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 3		
(1)	Number of law	RA 11494
(2)	Name of law (original language)	Bayanihan to Recover as One Act
(3)	Name of law (English)	Bayanihan to Recover as One Act
(4)	Date of first parliamentary motion	01 June 2020
(5)	Date of law's enactment	11 September 2020
(6)	Date of law's publication	14 September 2020
(7)	Is the Covid-19 pandemic explicitly mentioned as a motivation in the law or any accompanying text?	Yes
(8)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for the initial parliamentary motion for this law?	Yes
(9)	Was the Covid-19 pandemic a motivation for a significant revision of the legislative project after the initial parliamentary motion?	Not Applicable
(10)	Note on (7)-(9) (max. 300 words)	Law affirms continuing state of national emergency as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and continues to vest power upon the president to implement necessary response and recover interventions to mitigate against the economic and social costs arising from the public health emergency. It outlines the specific internal revenue sources and uses of PHP 146 billion economic stimulus and social reform budget.
(11)	Was this law a legislative package that contained multiple social reform components?	Yes
(12)	If (11) yes, how many distinct social reform components did it contain?	5

Law 3: Component 1		
(13)	Policy Area	Social assistance
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	Provision of new and/or additional budgetary allotments for cash assistance programs (most of which are in line with those mandated by RA 11469), including the: (1) DOLE's cash for work programs and unemployment assistance programs; (2) DSWD's cash assistance, relief distribution and feeding programs for daycare centers; (3) Department of Foreign Affairs' (DFA) program for assisting overseas Filipino workers; (4) new program providing temporary livelihood assistance to workers in the transportation sector, including public utility vehicle drivers.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Don't know
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Don't know

Law 3: Component 1		
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not specified by the law
(18)	Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	At the time of writing this report, guidelines for the implementation of the provisions have not been released by the relevant departments. Specific details of coverage – particularly of the DSWD programs – are therefore not yet available.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Maintenance
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	If fix-term, duration in months	Exact duration not specified in the law.
(22)	Note on (19)-(21) (max. 200 words)	Change in generosity of benefits is coded as ‘maintenance’ – as the social assistance measures maintain the amounts for cash transfers specified in RA 11469.
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	No
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	If fix-term, duration in months	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(29)	27.	PHP 20.72 billion
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Law
(33)	Note (29)-(31) (max. 200 words)	The breakdown of the estimated cost is as follows: (a) DSWD-administered social assistance programs – PHP 6 billion; (b) DOLE-administered social assistance programs for formal and informal workers – PHP 13 billion; (c) DFA-administered social assistance programs for overseas Filipino workers – PHP 1.82 billion; (4) social assistance to transport sector workers – PHP 6.9 billion.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 3: Component 2		
(13)	Policy Area	Labor market
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	Enables the provision of benefits for personnel in the frontline sectors (education and health) and other important economic and cultural sectors (tourism industry and sports); and labor activation programs, particularly for returning overseas Filipino workers.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	If fix-term, duration in months	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(18)	Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	The law provided additional budgetary allotments: (a) to cover for the new benefits received by health sector workers also specified in RA 11649; (b) to train and subsidize tourist guides; (c) for allowances and subsidies for displaced teaching and non-teaching personnel of education institutions; (d) to finance skills training programs for returning overseas Filipino workers; and (e) to provide allowances for national athletes and coaches.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Expansion
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	If fix-term, duration in months	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(22)	Note on (19)-(21) (max. 200 words)	The additional subsidies and allowances for tourist guides, displaced teaching and non-teaching personnel and overseas Filipino workers are on top of other statutory social security benefits.
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	If fix-term, duration in months	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(26)	Note on (23)-(25) (max. 200 words)	None
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No

Law 3: Component 2		
(28)	Note on (27) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Don't Know
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	PHP 15.08 billion
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Law
(33)	Note (29)-(31) (max. 200 words)	The breakdown of the costs is as follows: (a) Health workers benefits – PHP 13.5 billion; (b) Tourist guides benefits – PHP 100 million; (c) Benefits for education sector personnel – PHP 300 million; (d) Allowances for displaced national athletes and coaches – PHP 180 million; (e) Skills training program for returning overseas Filipino workers
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 3: Component 3		
(13)	Policy Area	Education
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	Provides budgetary allotments for supporting digital-based learning and tuition subsidies for students whose families face financial difficulties as a result of the pandemic and are not beneficiaries of conditional cash transfers program or any subsidy scheme of the Department of Education. Also provides for hiring teacher assistants for modular learning.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Expansion
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(18)	Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	Expansion of coverage relates to tuition subsidies, paid out directly to schools, which are made available to students from families not covered by existing and related social protection schemes.
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Fix-term
(21)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(22)	Note on (19)-(21) (max. 200 words)	
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Yes
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Fix-term
(25)	<i>If fix-term</i> , duration in months	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(26)	Note on (23)-(25) (max. 200 words)	None
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	PHP 7.6 billion
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Don't Know
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Law
(33)	Note (29)-(31) (max. 200 words)	The breakdown of the costs is as follows: (a) Development of smart campuses in state colleges and universities – PHP 3 billion; (b) Assist Department of Education in the implementation of Digital Education – PHP 4 billion; (c) Subsidies and allowances for students in need – PHP 600 million.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 3: Component 4		
(13)	Policy Area	Healthcare
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	Provisions for enabling healthcare-related Covid-19 response and recovery interventions, including budgetary allotments for: (a) the procurement of personal protective equipment for local health workers, <i>barangay</i> (tr. Village, which is the lowest sub-national government unit) health workers, and 'indigent' persons; (b) the establishment and operations of isolation facilities; (c) the hiring of 50,000 contract tracers; and (d) the procurement of Covid-19 medication and vaccine.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Duration of the state of National Emergency
(18)	Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	Not applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21) (max. 200 words)	None
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25) (max. 200 words)	None
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	PHP 22.5 billion
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Law
(33)	Note (29)-(31) (max. 200 words)	The breakdown of the costs is as follows: (a) procurement of PPE for selected sectors – PHP 3 billion; (b) construction, maintenance and operations of isolation facilities – PHP 4.5 billion; (c) hiring contract tracers – PHP 5 billion; (d) procurement of Covid-19 medication and vaccine – PHP 10 billion.
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know

Law 3: Component 5		
(13)	Policy Area	Other (Legislative reforms in other policy areas explicitly aimed at social protection (e.g. food subsidies or tax cuts aimed at social protection))
(14)	Brief description of reform component (max. 300 words)	The law provides for grace periods in the payment of loans from private and public financing institutions, and household utility bills; and a program for free healthy meals for undernourished children.
(15)	Change in coverage of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(16)	Duration of coverage change?	Not Applicable
(17)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(18)	Note on (15)-(17) (max. 200 words)	Not applicable
(19)	Change in generosity of existing benefits?	Not Applicable
(20)	Duration of generosity change?	Not Applicable
(21)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(22)	Note on (19)-(21) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(23)	Introduction of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(24)	Duration of new benefits?	Not Applicable
(25)	<i>If fix-term, duration in months</i>	Not Applicable
(26)	Note on (23)-(25) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable
(27)	Cuts of existing benefits?	No
(28)	Note on (27) (max. 200 words)	Not Applicable

Law 3: Component 5		
(29)	Estimated cost of reform in 2020 (national currency)	Don't Know
(30)	Estimated cost of reform in 2021 (national currency)	Not applicable
(31)	National Currency Code (ISO 4217)	PHP 608
(32)	Source of cost estimation	Other
(33)	Note (29)-(31) (max. 200 words)	None
(34)	If the implementation of the reform should already have started, has the reform been implemented?	Don't know